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® - multiplier of proportional penalty
° - rate of experience in cartel formationAbstract. The main feature of the penalty schemes described in current sentencing guidelines is
that the ¯ne is based on the accumulated gains from cartel or price-¯xing activities for the ¯rm.
The regulations thus suggest modelling the penalty as an increasing function of the accumulated
illegal gains from price-¯xing to the ¯rm, so that the history of the violation is taken into account.
We incorporate these features of the penalty scheme into an optimal control model of a pro¯t-
maximizing ¯rm under antitrust enforcement. To determine the e®ect of taking into account the
history of the violation, we compare the outcome of this model with a model where the penalty
is ¯xed. The analysis of the later model implies that complete deterrence can be achieved only
at the cost of shutting down the ¯rm. The proportional scheme improves upon the ¯xed penalty,
since it can ensure complete deterrence in the long run, even when penalties are moderate.
Phase-diagram analysis shows that the higher the probability and severity of punishment, the
sooner cartel formation is blocked. Further, a sensitivity analysis is provided to show which
strategies are most successful in reducing the degree of price-¯xing. It turns out that, when the
penalties are already high, the antitrust policy aiming at a further increase in the severity of
punishment is less e±cient than the policy that increases the probability of punishment.
Key Words. Optimal control, dynamic analysis, antitrust policy, antitrust laws.1 Introduction
This paper analyses the optimal policies for the deterrence of violations of antitrust law. We study
the e®ects of penalty schemes, determined according to the current US and EU antitrust laws, on
the behavior of the ¯rm. We investigate intertemporal aspects of this problem using a dynamic
optimal control model of utility maximization by the ¯rm under antitrust enforcement.
This paper addresses the problem of whether the ¯ne, determined on the basis of accumulated
turnover of the ¯rm participating in a cartel, can provide a complete deterrence outcome. We
assume that the imposed ¯ne takes into account the history of the violation. This means that
when the violation of antitrust law is discovered, the regulator is able to observe all accumulated
rents from cartel formation. Consequently, it will impose the ¯ne that takes into account this
information. We also compare the deterrence power of this system with the ¯xed penalty scheme.
The OECD report (2002) provides a description of the available sanctions for cartels according
to the laws of member countries (Ref. 1). Those laws allow for considerable ¯nes against enterprises
found to have participated in price-¯xing agreements. In some cases, however, the maximal ¯nes
determined by these laws may not be su±ciently large to accommodate multiples of the gain to
the cartel, as suggested by expected utility theory. In most of the countries the maximal ¯nes
2are expressed either in absolute terms or as a percentage (10%) of the overall annual turnover
of the ¯rm (Ref. 2). However, according to experts' estimations, the best policy is to impose
the penalties, which are a multiple of the illegal gains from price-¯xing agreements to the ¯rms.
This, of course, would be di±cult to estimate in real life, so it is still common practice to use the
percentage of turnover as a proxy of the gains from price-¯xing activities.
Several countries, namely the US, Germany, and New Zealand, have already accommodated
this more advanced system, where the ¯ne is stated in terms of unlawful gains (Ref. 3). In general,
the determination of the ¯nal amount of the ¯ne, to be paid by the ¯rm in each particular case, is
based on the degree of o®ence, which is proportional either to the amount of accumulated illegal
gains from the cartel or to its proxy, turnover involved throughout entire duration of infringement.
At the same time there exists an upper bound for the penalties for violations of antitrust law. The
¯ne is constrained from above by the maximum of a certain monetary amount, a multiple of the
illegal gains from the cartel, or if the illegal gain is not known, 10% of the total annual turnover
of the enterprise. The idea of the current paper is to incorporate these features of the current
penalty systems into a dynamic model of intertemporal utility maximization by a ¯rm, which is
subject to antitrust enforcement.
3Similar to Fent et al. (Ref. 4)) or Leung (Ref. 5), the set up of the problem leads to an
optimal control model. The main di®erence compared to Ref. 4 or 6 is that the gain from the
cartel accumulated by the ¯rm over the period of infringement takes the role of a state variable,
whereas the idea of Ref. 4 was to take the o®ender's criminal record as a state variable of the
dynamic game. An increase in the state variable is thus positively related to the degree of price
¯xing by the ¯rm, and increases the ¯ne the ¯rm can expect in case of being convicted.
Furthermore, this framework allows us to analyze the consequences of two major modi¯cations
of the penalty systems for violations of competition law, which have been recently suggested by
the OECD and US Department of Justice (DOJ). The modi¯cation suggested by the OECD was
concerned with the increase of the multiplier for the base ¯ne, while DOJ (Ref. 7) suggests to
increase the upper bound for the ¯ne up to $100 million. By solving the optimal control problem of
the ¯rm under antitrust enforcement, we will investigate the implications of the di®erent penalty
schedules.
The main results are that, for the benchmark case, i.e., when the penalty is ¯xed, the outcome
with complete deterrence of cartel formation is possible but only at the cost of shutting down the
¯rm. In other words, the ¯xed penalty, which can ensure complete deterrence, is too high, because
4it leads to immediate bankruptcy. However, the result can be improved by relating the penalty to
the illegal gains from price-¯xing. The proportional scheme appears to be more appropriate than
the ¯xed penalty, since it can ensure complete deterrence in the long run even in case penalties are
moderate. We also study the impact of the main parameters of the penalty scheme (probability
and severity of punishment) on the e±ciency of deterrence and analyze the optimal trade-o®
between changes in the scale parameter of the proportional penalty scheme and probability of law
enforcement. It turns out that, the higher the probability and severity of punishment, the earlier
the cartel formation is blocked. The sensitivity analysis shows that when the penalties are already
high, the antitrust policy aiming at a further increase in the severity of punishment is less e±cient
than the policy that increases the probability of punishment.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the general setup of an optimal
control model of the ¯rm under antitrust enforcement. In Section 3 we consider the case where
the upper bound for the penalty is an exogenously given ¯xed monetary amount. Moreover, we
will derive an analytical expression for this upper bound, which allows to achieve the result of
complete deterrence of price-¯xing. In Section 4 we investigate the implications of the penalty
being proportional to the accumulated gains from price-¯xing. We also conduct sensitivity analysis
5of the equilibrium values of the variables of the model with respect to the parameters of the penalty
scheme.
2 Optimal Control Model: General Setup
We introduce the basic ingredients of the intertemporal optimization problem of a pro¯t maximiz-
ing ¯rm, which participates in an illegal cartel. The key variable is the accumulated gains from
prior criminal o®ences (in case of a cartel, these o®ences are price-¯xing activities).
2.1. Dynamics of the Accumulated Rents from Price-Fixing.
The accumulated rents from price-¯xing, w(t), is the state variable of the model, which increases
depending on the degree of o®ence (price-¯xing). Using a continuous time scale the dynamics of
the accumulated rents from price-¯xing equals4
:
w(t) = ¼
mq(t)(2 ¡ q(t)); with w(0) = w0 ¸ 0: (1)
Where
:
w(t) stands for the change in the value of the state variable, q(t) denotes the degree
of price-¯xing by the ¯rm at instant t, and w0 is the initial wealth of the ¯rm before the start
4To simplify the analysis for the rest of this section we assume w0 = 0: However, relaxing this assumption does
not change the results stated in the propositions of the paper.
6of the planning horizon. Expression (1) rests on the assumption of the demand function being
linear. A complete derivation of expression (1) is given in Appendix 1 of the paper, where
:
w(t)
is associated with instantaneous producer surplus for the ¯rm caused by ¯xing price levels above
the competitive. The main idea behind this formulation is that cartel formation leads to higher
prices. The "normal" price is c (competitive equilibrium) leading to zero pro¯ts. Then q denotes
the degree of violation, i.e. when the cartel ¯xes a higher price than "normal". From the de¯nition
of q in the Appendix it is clear that in case of such a violation, i.e. when price is higher than
competitive level, q is positive. Based on a simple linear demand function5 , pro¯t (or producer
surplus), can be expressed as a concave function of q. Now the state variable w(t) adds up the
pro¯ts over time, and as such w(t) is the total gain from crime (too high prices) from time 0 up
to t.
There are strong legal and economic reasons for introduction of the state variable in the form
of accumulated rents from price-¯xing. It is related to the fact, that in US and EU guidelines
for imposition of ¯nes for antitrust violations, the penalty imposed in many cases is based mainly
on the turnover involved in the infringement throughout the entire duration of the infringement.
Clearly, the accumulated turnover serves as a proxy for accumulated gains from cartel or price-
5See Appendix, Section 5.
7¯xing activities for the ¯rm.
2.2. Pro¯t Function.
The instantaneous illegal gains from price-¯xing for the ¯rm equal ¼mq(t)(2¡q(t)); this func-
tion has been derived from the microeconomic model underlying the problem of price-¯xing6.
Obviously, this function implies that the marginal pro¯t for the ¯rm is always positive and strictly
declining in the interval q(t) 2 [0;1]. Moreover, for each positive level of o®ence the pro¯t is also
positive.
The instantaneous pro¯t at time t will also be in°uenced by accumulated rents from price-
¯xing. This variable also measures the experience the ¯rm has in forming a cartel. The more it has
experience, the more e±ciently the ¯rm colludes and, consequently, the higher the instantaneous
pro¯ts from price-¯xing. This in°uence is re°ected in the term °w(t) which enters additively the
objective function of the ¯rm; see expression (4) below7.
2.3. Law Enforcement Policy.
The goal of the current section is to incorporate the features of the penalty system for antitrust
6For complete derivation of this expression see the Appendix (Section 5).
7It may be more realistic to express this term as a nonlinear function of w: In particular, a concave formulation
may be very tractable since there might be decreasing marginal returns from experience. However, it will not
change the results of the paper in a qualitative sense. The solution of the model in case experience gain is modeled
as °
p
w gives the outcome with complete deterrence similar to Proposition 2 and results of sensitivity analysis for
the model with proportional penalty still hold. The analysis of the model, where penalty is ¯xed, with °
p
w term
gives the same qualitative result but the model can only be solved numerically.
A complete proof of this statement is available from author upon request.
8law violations, described above, into the optimal control model of intertemporal utility maximiza-
tion by the ¯rm in the presence of a benevolent antitrust authority, whose aim is to minimize
the loss of consumer surplus, i.e. to block any degree of price-¯xing. So, in order to capture
the speci¯cs of the sentencing guidelines and current antitrust practice, we model the penalty for
violations of antitrust law as a linear increasing function of the accumulated rents from price-¯xing
for the ¯rm. Therefore, it can be written as
s(w(t)) = ®w(t): (2)
This setup will also allow to study the e®ects of the changes of the multiplier for the base ¯ne
(re¯nement suggested by OECD) on the deterrence power of the penalty scheme.
According to Becker (Ref. 8)) the cost of di®erent punishment to an o®ender can be made
comparable by converting them into their monetary equivalent or worth. And this is satis¯ed in
our model, since we measure the accumulated rents from price-¯xing for the ¯rm in monetary
units. Moreover, our speci¯cation of the penalty function satis¯es three main conditions speci¯ed
in Ref. 4, namely: it is strictly increasing in the level of o®ence (since w(t) is strictly increasing
in q(t)), ¯rms which do not collude at all should not be punished (s(w0) = 0); and any detected
9positive level of o®ence should lead to a positive amount of punishment (s(w(t)) > 0; for any
w(t) > w0, which is equivalent to q(t) > 0 for some t 2 [0;T]): This implies that, if the ¯rm
has been checked, violated the law in the current period and participated in the cartel in some of
the previous periods, the ¯ne will be imposed on the basis of the whole accumulated gains from
price-¯xing, w(t), and thus not only on the basis of the current degree of o®ence, q(t):
Further, we will compare the e±ciency and deterrence power of the penalty systems for a
model in which the penalty is given by expression (2) and a model in which the penalty is ¯xed
(s(t) = Smax), where Smax is the ¯xed upper bound for the penalty introduced in the sentencing
guidelines, which is not related to the level of o®ence.
2.4. Costs of Being Punished.
The cost of being punished at time t equals the expected value of the ¯ne that has to be paid.
This will be de¯ned as the multiple of the probability of being checked by antitrust authority, p
(level of law enforcement); times the degree of o®ence at time t, q(t); times the level of punishment,
which depends on time as well:
expected penalty = s(t)q(t)p; with p 2 [0;1]: (3)
10So, the expected penalty is determined by expression (3), where pq(t) is the probability of
being punished at time t and s(t) is the ¯ne, which may either be ¯xed or can be expressed as a
function of accumulated gains from price-¯xing.
We should stress here that the ¯rm can only be caught at time t if q(t) > 0; i.e. the o®ence is
committed exactly at this time. Of course this need not be the case for criminal acts in general:
you can convict a thief, if the police has found the stolen things without having caught the
burglar in action.8 However, it does apply to antitrust law practices. According to Refs. 1 and 3,
investigation concerning past behavior only starts at the moment it is observed that the current
price exceeds the competitive price, thus when q(t) > 0. After this is proved (usually on the
basis of empirical analysis of price mark-ups), the antitrust authority will start a more detailed
investigation and get access to accounting books and documents that can prove the existence of a
cartel agreement. Only after that the gains from price-¯xing (w(t)) become \perfectly observable",
so that the court (or competition authority) can take them into account while determining the
amount of ¯ne to be paid.9
8We thank an anonymous referee who pointed out this di®erence.
9Here it is also important to realize that the probability of being caught at instant t is pq(t). So that the ¯rm
can only be caught at time t1 if it does price ¯xing on that date, so if q(t1) > 0. Later in time, say at time t2 > t1,
the ¯rm cannot be punished because of the o®ence at time t1. At t2 it can only be caught and punished if q(t2) > 0.
At the moment the ¯rm is caught it has to pay a ¯ne, s(t). In one scenario this ¯ne is an increasing function of
w(t). So, this means that if the ¯rm did a lot of price-¯xing in the past, implying that w(t) is large, the ¯ne will
be larger. In this sense repeated o®enders are more heavily punished, and this is what quite frequently happens in
modern democratic societies. So if the ¯rm is caught at time t2, it is convicted for the crime on t2, and the level of
the ¯ne depends on what the ¯rm did in the past, thus also what it did at time t1 < t2 as well. In other words, the
112.5. Optimization Problem.







mq(t)(2 ¡ q(t)) + °w(t) ¡ s(t)pq(t)]dt (4)
s.t.
:
w(t) = ¼mq(t)(2 ¡ q(t)) and q(t) 2 [0;1]:
The parameter r is the discount rate. The objective functional J(q(t)) is the discounted pro¯t
stream gained from engaging in price-¯xing activities. The term ¼mq(t)(2 ¡ q(t)) re°ects the
instantaneous rents from collusion and the term ¡s(t)p(t)q(t) re°ects the possible punishment for
the ¯rm, if it is caught. Note that the higher the degree of collusion, the higher the q(t), the
higher the expected punishment. °w(t) re°ects the experience of the ¯rm in cartel formation that
increases future instantaneous gains from cartel formation.
Having made the assumptions of section 2 we de¯ne the current value Hamiltonian:
H
c(q;w;¹) = ¼
mq(t)(2 ¡ q(t)) + °w(t) ¡ s(t)pq(t) + ¹(t)(¼
mq(t)(2 ¡ q(t))) (5)
higher the degree of price ¯xing at t1, the larger the ¯ne will be at t2. This is independent of how many times the
¯rm was caught in the past: the ¯ne the ¯rm paid before will not be subtracted from w. Since w is non-decreasing
over time, it is implicitly taken into account that repeated o®enders will be more heavily punished.
12where ¹(t) is the current value adjoint variable representing the shadow price of the o®ence.
The Hamiltonian is well-de¯ned and di®erentiable for all nonnegative values of the state variable
w(t) and all values of the control variable q(t) in its domain [0;1].
3 Penalty Represented by a Fixed Monetary Amount
In this section we would like to model the situation where penalty for violations of antitrust law is
represented by a ¯xed monetary amount. In this case we assume that the ¯ne does not depend on
the accumulated gains from price-¯xing and constant over time. This might be a good framework
to study the e±ciency of antitrust enforcement in an environment where there exists an upper
bound for penalties and o®ences are so grave that punishment always reaches its upper bound,
which is true for highly cartelized markets. The analysis of this model is quite essential, since the
imposition of the upper bound for penalties for violations of antitrust law is still a current practice
in most countries. Only Norway and Denmark do not have this limitation. This model will also
allow to take into account DOJ new policy that suggests to increase the upper bound for the ¯ne
for violations of antitrust law up to $100 million. We modify the model of Section 2 in such a way
that the ¯ne is given by some ¯xed monetary amount, Smax; which denotes the maximal penalty.
13In other words, the antitrust authority commits to a policy of the following form: the rate of law
enforcement is constant p(t) = p 2 (0;1] for all t; and, when the ¯rm is inspected, the penalty is
s(t) = Smax if q(t) > 0 and s(t) = 0 if q(t) = 0:
In this section we show that if the ¯xed penalty (or upper bound for the ¯ne imposed by law)
is not high enough, complete deterrence is never possible. Moreover, we will derive an analytical
expression for the upper bound, which allows to achieve the result of complete deterrence of price-
¯xing. The main di®erence with the model with proportional penalty is that the penalty does
not depend on accumulated illegal gains. For simplicity, we assume that there is no discounting10
(r = 0), the planning horizon is ¯nite (T < 1); salvage values for both players are equal to zero,
so that the transversality conditions are ¸(T) = 0; ¹(T) = 0 for both players.












10To make the analysis more transparent and analytically solvable we assume here that r = 0. However, imposing
that r > 0 does not change the qualitative predictions of the model. Only the dynamics of the costate variable
of the ¯rm changes. The equation for ¹(t) becomes ¹(t) =
°
r(1 ¡ e(t¡T)): A complete proof of this statement is
available from author upon request.
14The expression (7) gives
:
¹(t) = ¡°: Solving this simple di®erential equation in case of ¯nite
planning horizon, we get ¹(t) = °(T ¡ t): Consequently, we get ¹(t) ¸ 0 for all t 2 [0;T] . This
allows us to conclude that the Hamiltonian (5) is strictly concave with respect to q. Therefore,
condition (6) is equivalent to Hc
q = 0. It leads to
q
¤(t) = 1 ¡
pSmax
2¼m(1 + °(T ¡ t))
= C (8)
However, the control region of the o®ence rate q is limited by [0;1], by construction. This




Following expression (8), we can represent the optimal degree of price-¯xing by the ¯rm, q, as
a decreasing function of both the penalty for violation and time. The ¯rst part of this statement is
quite intuitive, since a higher expected penalty will, obviously, increase the incentives for the pro¯t
maximizing ¯rms to avoid participation in price-¯xing agreements and thus reduce the degree of
o®ence, q. The negative relationship between the degree of price-¯xing and time is related to
the fact that higher gains from price-¯xing in the beginning imply that for a longer time period
the ¯rm can take an advantage of it, in the sense that due to increased experience pro¯ts from
price-¯xing will be higher. So, incentives to commit crime decrease over time and, hence, the
15degree of o®ence falls.
3.1. State-Control Dynamics.
After we substitute (8) into (1) the di®erential equation describing the dynamics of the state





2¼m(1 + °(T ¡ t))
)
2) (9)
The results of the solution of this di®erential equation for di®erent values of Smax and other
parameters being p = 1
2;¼m = 2;° = 1
2;T = 10;w(0) = 1 are summarized in the following table:
Table 1
Penalty Accumulated gains from collusion Degree of price-¯xing
Smax = 2 w(t) = 1
2(¡12+t) + 2t + 25
24;! w(T) ¼ 20:792 q¤(t) = 1 ¡ 1
24¡2t;! q(T) ¼ 3
4
Smax = 10 w(t) = 25
2(¡12+t) + 2t + 49
24;! w(T) ¼ 15:792 q¤(t) = 1 ¡ 5
24¡2t;! q(T) = 0
Smax = 20 w(t) = 50
(¡12+t) + 2t + 31
6 ;! w(T) ¼ 0:166 q¤(t) = 1 ¡ 10
24¡2t;! q(T) = 0
Consequently, when all the parameters of the model are ¯xed, w(t) is increasing over time
and the degree of o®ence is a decreasing function of time. Unfortunately, we must conclude that,
for example, when the ¯xed penalty equals 2, which is the instantaneous monopoly pro¯t for the
¯rm for these parameter values, it does not allow to achieve complete deterrence even in the last
16period. On the contrary, the last period degree of price-¯xing is quite high (75% out of 100%).
We can conclude that the policies with ¯xed penalty appear to be highly ine±cient, since to
achieve q¤(t) = 0 for all t 2 [0;T] we should have 1 ¡
s(t)p
2¼m(1+°(T¡t)) · 0; which implies s(t) ¸
2¼m(1+°(T¡t))
p : In the example with parameter values T = 10;¼m = 2;° = 1
2;p = 1
2 we get
s(0) ¸ 48 = 24¼m and s(T) = s(10) ¸ 8 = 4¼m. This enormous penalty will drive the ¯rm
bankrupt immediately. Moreover, this result is counterintuitive and unfair, since the ¯rm colluding
for one period will obtain less extra gain than a ¯rm colluding for ten periods, and, consequently,
should be punished less.
The main result of the analysis of the model with ¯xed penalty is represented in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3.1. In the optimal control model, where p(t) = p > 0 for all t 2 [0;T]; the no
collusion outcome (i.e. complete deterrence of price-¯xing) occurs when Smax(t) ¸
2¼m(1+°(T¡t))
p
for all t 2 [0;T] , thus when Smax(0) ¸
2¼m(1+°T)
p .
The implication of this result is that the penalty for antitrust violation, which potentially can
provide complete deterrence, should be imposed by the antitrust authority (thus, not by the court),
i.e. by the authority which has complete information about the probability of law enforcement.
17The ¯ne should be inversely related to the probability of investigation (similar to Ref.8). Moreover,
the penalty should be based mainly on the instantaneous monopoly pro¯ts in the industry. Of
course, this value is di®erent for each industry, so the speci¯cs of the industry also should be
taken into account when the optimal ¯ne for antitrust violations is determined. The length of the
planning horizon should also be taken into account.
However, in real life the implementation of this scheme is problematic, since the court (not the
antitrust authority) imposes the penalty and, consequently, the parameter p cannot be veri¯ed.
Unfortunately, the ¯xed penalty system does not always work. For Sfixed <
2¼m(1+°(T¡t))
p for
some t; the result with no price-¯xing outcome during the whole planning period is not possible.
However, the new DOJ policy may be quite successful, since $100 million seems to be higher than
2¼m(1+°T)
p for reasonable parameter values, such as p = 1
5;¼m = $1million,° = 1
5;T = 10:
Moreover, this result resembles the result of Emons (Ref. 9), where the subgame perfect pun-
ishment for repeated o®enders in a repeated games setting was investigated. The ¯nal conclusion
of the paper is that if the regulator's aim is to block violation at the lowest possible cost, the
penalty should be a decreasing function of time. Moreover, he concludes that the ¯rst period
penalty (penalty for the ¯rst detected violation) should be the highest and should extract the
18entire wealth of the o®ender. So, another drawback of this system is that it does not explain esca-
lating sanctions based on o®ense history which are embedded in many penal codes and sentencing
guidelines.
Another problem with this result is that the ¯xed penalty, which can ensure complete de-
terrence, is too high. It is clearly unbearable for the ¯rm and leads to immediate bankruptcy.
Already for the ¯rst violation we have to punish twenty times more than the maximal per-period
monopoly pro¯t. To resolve this "impossibility result" we look at the other scheme that relates
the penalty to the illegal gains from price-¯xing. In particular, in the next section we introduce
the penalty as a linear increasing function of accumulated gains from price ¯xing for the ¯rm given
by the expression (2) above. The proportional scheme is preferred to the ¯xed penalty, since it
can ensure complete deterrence in the long run even in the case where penalties are moderate.
4 Analysis of the Model where the Penalty Schedule Is
Given by s(t) = ®w(t):
This setup re°ects another important feature of the penalty systems for violations of antitrust law
suggested by current sentencing guidelines. Namely, that the ¯ne is proportional to the illegal
19gains from cartel formation. This more advanced system has already been implemented in the
US, Germany, New Zealand, and some other countries.
4.1. Utility maximization.






¹(t) ¡ r¹(t) = ¡° + ®pq(t) (11)
Since the control region of the o®ence rate q is limited by [0;1], the maximization condition






1 if C > 1




We conclude that the optimal degree of price-¯xing by the ¯rm is a decreasing function of
both the penalty for violation and the probability of law enforcement. This is also quite intuitive
from an economic point of view. The pro¯t maximizing ¯rm will reduce their optimal degree of
price-¯xing in response to the increase in the rate of law enforcement, since it makes conviction
more likely. Secondly, increase in accumulated rents from collusion also rises the expected penalty,
20and this gives an additional incentive for the ¯rm to reduce the degree of price-¯xing. This allows
the system to gradually converge to the socially desirable outcome with no price-¯xing.
4.2. State-Costate Dynamics.
Substituting (12) into (1) and (11) gives the following system of di®erential equations:
:




¹(t) = ¡° + ®p(1 ¡
®wp
2¼m(1+¹)) + r¹ = 0
(13)
A stationary point can be obtained by intersecting the locuses
:
w = 0 and
:





and w(¹) = 2¼
m¡°¹ ¡ ° + p®¹ + p® + ¹2r + r¹
®2p2 :






®p . This implies that q¤ = 0.
The necessary conditions for existence of stationary points in the positive orthant are ° < r
and p > 0:11 This means that, when the extra bene¯ts for the ¯rm from cartel formation do not
11The detailed proof of this statement is available from authors upon request.
21increase much with the experience of the ¯rm in cartel formation (° < r), the outcome with no
collusion is more likely to be sustained in the long run, since it is less attractive for the ¯rm to
participate in the cartel agreements. So, a unique stationary point in the positive orthant always
exists, except when p = 0 (i.e the probability to be caught is zero) or when ° > r (i.e. the extra
bene¯ts for the ¯rm from cartel formation increase very fast when the experience of the ¯rm in
cartel formation increases). The optimal control problem does not have a stable solution in cases
p = 0 or ° > r.
Example 4.1: Next, the solution procedure and construction of the phase portrait is illus-
trated via an example. We construct the phase portrait when the parameters are ° = 0:5;¼m =
1;® = 2;p = 0:2;r = 0:2: The
:








(225 + 160w): The stationary point then satis¯es w¤ = 35
2 and
¹¤ = 2:5:
[Place Figure 1 about here]
Studying the stability of the steady state equilibrium w¤ = 35
2 and ¹¤ = 2:5 we obtain the
following expressions for the values of trace and determinant of the Jacobian matrix of the system
(13): trace J = 1
5 > 0 and det J = ¡ 4
175 < 0:
22This allows us to conclude that the point with w¤ = 35
2 ;¹¤ = 2:5;q¤ = 0 is a saddle point.
4.3. Stability Analysis.































Obviously, the determinant has to be evaluated in the steady state (¹¤;w¤;q¤). It turns out
that trace J > 0 and det J < 0; so that the steady state is a saddle point.
In general, with arbitrary values of the parameters and arbitrary equilibrium values the matrix
J has two real eigenvalues of opposite sign and the steady state has the local saddle-point property.
This means that there exists a manifold containing the equilibrium point such that, if the system
starts at the initial time on this manifold and at the neighborhood of the equilibrium point, it will
approach the equilibrium point at t ! 1:
This proves the following proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The outcome with complete deterrence is sustainable in the long run, given







23and q¤ = 0 is a saddle point.
Proposition implies that in the long run the full compliance behavior arises in a sense that
the outcome with q¤ = 0 is the saddle point equilibrium of the model. This means that one can
always choose the initial value for the adjoint variable such that the equilibrium trajectory starts
on the stable manifold and converges to the steady state. Economically speaking, the ¯rm which
maximizes pro¯ts over time under a proportional penalty scheme will gradually reduce the degree
of violation to zero. However there is one exception: for p = 0 the degree of o®ence is maximal.
The parameter ® in°uences only the speed of convergence to the steady state value, not the steady
state value of the control variable. Clearly, a higher ® increases incentives for the ¯rm to stop
the violation earlier. Basically, deciding on the time of stopping the violation the ¯rm compares
the expected punishment and expected bene¯ts from crime. Consequently, since in the setup with
proportional penalty the expected punishment also rises when the bene¯ts from price-¯xing rise,
in the long run the system will end up in the equilibrium with full compliance.
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis.
Here we investigate in which direction the saddle point equilibrium moves if the set of parameter
values changes. Analyzing the properties of the proportional penalty scheme (s(t) = ®w(t));
24the main parameters of our interest are the scale parameter of the penalty schedule, ®; and the
parameter which determines the certainty of punishment, p: They appear to be also quite important
parameters for the ¯rm, whose objective is to maximize the expected rents from price-¯xing in the
presence of antitrust enforcement. Clearly, the ¯rm will condition its behavior on the parameters
of the penalty scheme, chosen by the regulator (see expression (4)). Moreover, the result obtained
below will provide hints on how to choose the optimal enforcement policy to minimize the steady
state degree of price-¯xing by the ¯rms.
As a result of the necessary optimality conditions, in the steady state equilibrium it holds that
:
w(t) = f(q;w;¹;®) = ¼mq(2 ¡ q) = 0;
:
¹(t) = r¹(t) ¡ Hw(q;w;¹;®) = r¹ ¡ ° + ®pq = 0;
Hq(q;w;¹;®) = (2¼m ¡ 2¼mq)(1 + ¹) ¡ ®wp = 0:
Computing the total derivatives of the above equations with respect to ® and appling Cramer's




r < 0: In a similar way we study the behavior of the costate variable




r < 0: This means that
the equilibrium steady state value of the shadow price decreases when the slope of the penalty
function (®) increases or the rate of law enforcement increases. The reason is that with higher ®
12More detailed derivations of these results are available from authors upon request.
25or p a higher accumulated wealth increases the expected punishment much faster than in the case
when ® or p are low.
In the same way we can derive the sign of @w
@® and @w










rp < 0. This means that either an increase in the scale parameter of the penalty
scheme or an increase in the certainty of punishment would cause a reduction of the equilibrium
accumulated rents from collusion, so that the ¯rms will try to reduce their gains in order to be
punished less.
Finally, we have a look at the change of the o®ence level caused by a change in the slope of
the punishment function or a change in the rate of law enforcement. That means we are now









So, we can conclude that the e®ect of either change in certainty or in severity of the penalty on
the equilibrium value of the degree of o®ence is absent. It follows logically from the model, since
q¤ = 0 is a steady state solution of the model and its absolute value and existence does not depend
on the size of the parameters ® and p:
The change in ® or in p only in°uences the t¤¤ value in the Figure 213. Numerical analysis of
13A no price-¯xing outcome (q(t) = 0) can be sustained, but it occurs only at the end of the planning period. To
be more precise, the dynamics of the optimal behavior of the ¯rm is such that, given the parameters of the penalty
26the behavior of the state and control variables of the model with respect to the main parameters of
the penalty scheme (® and p) shows that a higher ® or p leads to earlier deterrence, i.e. t¤¤ moves
closer to the origin (see Figure 2). Consequently, the degree of price ¯xing is lower at each instant
of time and total accumulated gains from price-¯xing by the colluding ¯rm are lower. Moreover,
this policy allows to reduce the costs for society as well, since we can block violation earlier and
hence reduce the control e®orts earlier.
[Place Figure 2 about here]
Looking at the partial derivatives of the state variable of the model with respect to the main
parameters of the penalty scheme we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4.2.
a) Under the policies that provide underdeterrence, i.e. when ® is low, i.e. ® = p 2 [0;1], the
e®ects of detection probability and severity of punishment on the deterrence power of the penalty
scheme in the steady state are equal.
b) When ® is high, i.e. under the policies that can potentially provide more e±cient deterrence,
system (p and ®); the ¯rm gradually reduces the degree of o®ence to zero, which happens at time t¤¤. After that
no more collusion will take place. Consequently, accumulated gains from price-¯xing will gradually increase and
after t = t¤¤ will stay at the level w(t¤¤): The parameters of the penalty system (p and ®) have an impact on the
optimal behavior of the ¯rm and consequently on the deterrence power of the penalty system, which is measured
by the timing of optimal deterrence or, in other words, by the value of t¤¤. The higher the ® and p the closer the
t¤¤ to the origin, and consequently the earlier the cartel formation is blocked.
27the e®ect of the increase of probability of punishment on the deterrence power of the penalty
scheme in steady state is much stronger.
Proof:
Consider the partial derivatives of the state variable of the model with respect to the main



















Now we can show that, when ® is potentially higher than p; thus, for instance, when ® > 1;
the decrease in w, in absolute terms, when ® increases, is much less than the decrease in w,








r : Similarly, keeping in mind that p 2 [0;1] by construction, from the expression
for @w











End of the proof.
The general conclusion of this subsection is that, when w0 = 0; only partial deterrence is
feasible. But nevertheless, q(t) = 0 for some t 2 [t¤¤;T] can be achieved in the model if p(t) > 0
for all t 2 [0;T] and the equilibrium with q¤ = 0 can be sustained as the long run saddle point
steady state equilibrium of the model with penalty system given by s(t) = ®w(t) and p > 0 under
28certain additional conditions on the parameters of the model.
Moreover, studying the sensitivity of the steady state values of the main variables of the
model with respect to the parameters of the penalty scheme we found an interesting result, which
gives new insights into the problem of optimal trade-o® between the probability and severity of
punishment. This problem has been studied quite extensively in a static setting by Polinsky and
Shavell (Ref. 10) and later by Garoupa (Refs. 11-12). The result, stated in proposition 4.2, shows
that, when the penalty is high a further increase in the severity of punishment is less e±cient than
an increase in probability of punishment.
5 Appendix: Static Microeconomic Model of Price-¯xing
Let us consider an industry with N symmetric ¯rms engaged in a price ¯xing agreement. Assume
that they can agree and increase prices from pc = c to p > c each; where c is the marginal cost
in the industry. Since ¯rms are symmetric, each of them has equal weight in the coalition and
consequently total cartel pro¯ts will be divided equally among them.14 Hence, the whole market
for the product (in which the price-¯xing agreement has been achieved) will be divided equally
14We assume also that there is no strategic interaction between the ¯rms in the coalition in the sense that we
abstract from the possibility of self-reporting or any other non-cooperative behavior of the ¯rms towards each other.
29among N ¯rms, so each ¯rm operates in a speci¯c market in which the inverse demand function
equals p(Q) = 1 ¡ Q. They are identical in all submarkets. Under these assumptions we can
simplify the setting by considering not the whole cartel (group of violators) but only one ¯rm, and
apply similar sanctions to all the members of cartel.15 Further we denote: pm is the monopoly
price in the industry under consideration and p = 1¡Q is the inverse demand for a particular ¯rm.
In order to be able to represent consumer surplus and extra pro¯ts from price ¯xing for the ¯rm
(¼) in terms of the degree of collusion, we specify the variable q as follows. Let q =
p¡c
pm¡c;where
pm is the monopoly price, and p is the price level agreed by the ¯rms. Then we can conclude
that q 2 [0;1] and instantaneous extra pro¯ts from price-¯xing for this particular ¯rm will be







Let (pm¡c)2 = A: With linear demand p = 1¡Q we observe that pm = 1+c
2 ; so that 1¡c
pm¡c = 2
and, consequently, it holds that A =
(1¡c)2
4 = ¼m (monopoly pro¯t in this particular market).
The instantaneous producer surplus, consumer surplus and net loss in consumer surplus are
represented in Figure 3.
[Place Figure 3 about here]
15Of cause, in these settings the incentives of the ¯rms to betray the cartel cannot be taken into account and the
possibility to in°uence the internal stability of the cartel is not feasible. But this is the topic for another paper.
30So, instantaneous Producer surplus will be determined as PS(q) = ¼(q) = ¼mq(2¡q): Net loss
of consumer surplus will be the area of the right triangle, i.e. net loss of CS = 1
2¼mq2: Consumer
surplus will be determined by the area of triangle ABC: CS(q) = 1
2¼m(2 ¡ q)2:
Note that we can represent consumer and producer surpluses as a continuous di®erentiable
functions of the degree of price-¯xing, i.e. PS0(q) > 0; Net Loss of CS0(q) > 0; and CS0(q) < 0;
while PS00(q) < 0; Net Loss of CS00(q) > 0; and CS00(q) > 0 for all q 2 [0;1]:
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